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INTRODUCTION
The collapse of WorldCom and Enron highlighted several failings of US corporate governance. Subsequent scrutiny has revealed that while some of the circumstances surrounding the collapse were specific to the companies themselves, systemic failures of corporate governance also played a part. Excessive executive pay and deficiencies in the settlement of mutual fund charges are just two examples of systemic failures that have come to the forefront recently. Governance failures are also apparent globally, with examples ranging from the failure of Equitable Life in the United Kingdom to the collapse of Parmalat in Italy. Pension funds deliver a significant component of retirement income in many countries, but their governance has attracted much less attention than the governance of corporations. In many cases, decision making in pension funds is in the hands of a relatively small number of individuals who are subject to relatively little oversight. While regulation is quite stringent in some countries, in others it is often inconsistent or nonexistent. Clark (2000) reviews private pension fund governance in detail in an international context.
Analyses of public pension funds find underperformance relative to benchmarks. Governance, especially with respect to portfolio management, has significant implications for the investment performance of funds, and deserves attention for this reason alone. Iglesias and Palacios (2000) find that public pension funds in countries with poor governance structures significantly underperform the wider market. Mitchell and Hsin (1999) find that, in general, the poor investment performance of US state pension funds is due to their inadequate governance structures. There is thus ample evidence to suggest that in the public sector, pension investments underperform at least in part because of weak governance. Weak governance and poor performance are by no means universal in the public sector, however. For example, the US Federal Thrift Savings Plan is a clear example of a public sector entity with a strong governance structure which has performed well relative to its peers.
In a private setting, the most significant issue seems to be how decision makers make their investment decisions. These individuals do not exhibit high degrees of financial literacy and their investment behaviour tends to gravitate towards default options (Choi et al. 2001; Iyengar et al. 2003) . If the trust structures for corporate pension fund governance rely on individuals who are not required to have high levels of expertise, then there is clearly a need for more oversight of pension fund decision making.
In 2000, the British Treasury commissioned Paul Myners to conduct a review of institutional investment in the United Kingdom (HM Treasury 2001). Myners focused in particular on pension fund investment governance. At the time, there was concern that pension fund trustees were excessively conservative and unwilling to consider investments (such as private equity) deemed necessary to develop British industry. The review found that although UK trustees in aggregate were managing assets worth over £600 billion on behalf of members, most had received only a few days of investment training. This is of concern, because there are complex factors involved in overseeing defined benefit pension fund assets, ranging from the interpretation of powers in the trust deed to careful attention to the risk profile of the sponsor. Slow decision making, especially in asset allocation, can be a problem, as can conflict-ofinterest issues arising from the lack of separation of some trustee boards from their corporate parents.
The situation is somewhat simpler for trustees in Australia in that most funds are defined contribution funds. This means that there is less need to worry about the strength of the sponsoring company or to understand in detail the implicit options embedded in trust deeds and covenants. Defined contribution funds also offer less scope for discretionary adjustments to redistribute benefits across generations. Nevertheless, in any setting with directed investment decision making, there is still an important burden in selecting investments on behalf of members. And, as Bateman and Mitchell (2004) show, the range of defined contribution funds in Australia in terms of costs and structures is quite broad, thereby complicating analysis.
This chapter reviews the results of a survey of pension fund governance in Australia conducted by the authors in 2004-05. It is a modification of a 2001 survey of 106 large British pension funds developed by Professor A. Kakabadse of the Cranfield School of Management in conjunction with Watson Wyatt.
1 The British survey confirmed many of the key findings of the Myners review, including the lack of specific expertise of many pension fund trustees.
On the whole trustees did not view this as an impediment, however, because they saw themselves not as technical experts but as a body to select technical experts. Most trustees had held their positions for some time, felt that the board of trustees functioned cohesively as a group and found their work enjoyable and rewarding.
We begin in section 2 by discussing the main features of the Australian survey and summarizing the results on trustee demographics. Section 3 reviews the expertise of trustees and section 4 examines their beliefs, attitudes and working relationships. Section 5 focuses specifically on trustee decision making and section 6 discusses issues for the future. Our conclusions are presented in section 7.
SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND TRUSTEE DEMOGRAPHICS
Data collection began with a pilot survey administered in May 2004. This involved mailing questionnaires to approximately 1,000 trustees from funds in the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) database. Of the surveys mailed out, a substantial number (about 100) were returned because they were incorrectly addressed, and in the end we received only 48 completed surveys. About half of these were from corporate funds, with the remainder split among master trusts, industry funds, public funds and self-managed funds. The pilot survey was followed by a more structured survey of the top 200 funds in Australia. Conducted in late 2004 and early 2005, it generated responses from 131 trustees at 54 funds (Table 9 .1). About 53 per cent of the trustees who responded were from industry funds and 37 per cent from corporate funds. Another 8 per cent were from public sector funds, with other categories occupying negligible proportions. In aggregate, the 54 funds managed about A$103 billion in assets and hence represented about 17 per cent of total funds under management in Australia.
In Australian terminology, corporate funds are superannuation funds established for the benefit of employees of a particular company, group of companies or group of employers. Industry funds are multi-employer superannuation funds. An industry fund may cover a specific industry or a range of industries, either nationally or within a state. The trustees of industry funds are generally appointed by trade unions or employer associations. Public sector funds are superannuation funds (often referred to as 'schemes') that provide benefits for federal, state, territory or local government employees. A master trust allows individual investors to pool their funds so as to obtain wholesale prices and rates unavailable to regular investors. Wholesale arrangements can sometimes be negotiated by employers.
Only about 5 per cent of the trustees in our sample were under the age of 40 (Table 9 .2). Over 40 per cent had more than five years' experience on their current board and over half reported an average length of service across all the boards on which they had served of more than five years. Most trustees were sitting on only one board at the time of the survey. Altruism and loyalty did not feature prominently among their reasons for becoming a trustee. Some had to do it as part of their job or had been invited to join the board. About a third viewed it as an opportunity to either acquire new skills or learn more about superannuation.
A substantial minority of the trustees surveyed (about 40 per cent) had a background in finance. Almost all trustees considered their fellow trustees to be financially proficient. These results are consistent with those of Robinson and Kakabadse (2002) for the United Kingdom, where not a single trustee admitted to poor financial expertise and very few thought this was true of their trustee group as a whole.
EXPERTISE
While believing themselves to be financially proficient, many trustees lacked formal investment qualifications (Table 9. 3). Indeed, 13.7 per cent said they had no relevant qualifications and a further 12.2 per cent reported a trustee designation only. A similar result was evident in the United Kingdom, where 23.9 per cent of trustees reported having no relevant qualifications (Robinson and Kakabadse 2002). As in the United Kingdom, the share of trustees with an investment or finance qualification was low in the Australian sample, at 14.5 per cent. About half of the funds in the Australian survey had regular training programmes in place, with most others relying on ad hoc training as required.
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Only 26.0 per cent of trustees received more than three days of training within 12 months of becoming a trustee and 17.0 per cent received none. Despite their lack of training, most trustees considered they had a good knowledge of investment language and performance management reporting. They also felt they had a satisfactory understanding of asset-liability modelling, risk budgeting and liability-linked benchmarks. They tended to delegate important areas of decision making to consultants, from strategic asset allocation and performance monitoring through to managerial structures and benchmark design. More than 60 per cent of trustees said there were no regular measures in place to assess their effectiveness.
BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND WORKING RELATIONSHIPS
A majority of the trustees surveyed found their work challenging and reported having excellent working relationships with their fellow trustees (Table 9 .4). This was especially evident in the answers to the questions about the functioning of the board of trustees. On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly a 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree.
Source: Authors' survey of Australian superannuation funds. agree), 37 per cent of trustees strongly agreed with the statement that there was a good working relationship between the chair and the board of trustees, and none gave this a score of less than 3. There was also a high level of agreement with the statements that 'The board of trustees is pulling in the same direction', 'There is a good team spirit on the board of trustees' and 'The quality of board meetings is high'. Trustees strongly disagreed with the statements that 'There are one or two individuals on the board of trustees who are not suited to the role' and 'Individuals on the board of trustees could be more tolerant of each other'. They strongly agreed with the statement that trustees faced a heavy regulatory burden. Based on ordered logit regressions, Table 9 .5 presents the results for the statement that 'The quality of board meetings is high'. The analysis indicates that a good mix of capabilities and skills on the board of trustees greatly improves the quality of meetings, whereas a clear statement of responsibilities for the group, if anything, works in the opposite direction.
The picture that emerges from the analysis is one of a rather contented group of individuals who dislike formality and regulation and share a common set of beliefs, as reflected in regression results exploring trustees' attitudes towards the trustee model. They indicate that the trustees of public sector and other large funds (those with more than 10,000 members) are significantly less likely to agree with the statement that the current trustee model is outmoded and needs a radical overhaul-as, surprisingly, are trustees with a finance background. They are more likely to agree that individuals on the board of trustees could be more tolerant of each other, that the trustee's role is becoming more complex and that trustees face a heavy regulatory burden. a When 0.10 ≥ P > 0.05, the explanatory variable is significant at the 10 per cent level of confidence; when 0.05 ≥ P > 0.01, the explanatory variable is significant at the 5 per cent level of confidence; and when 0.01 ≥ P, the explanatory variable is significant at the 1 per cent level of confidence.
Source: Authors' calculations. Table 9 .6 summarizes the results for trustee decision making. It shows a high degree of consensus among trustees that they represent all stakeholders, that they are given adequate time to discuss issues and that neither the chair nor outside advisers have a high degree of influence over the agenda. For example, the lowest score on a scale of 1-7 for the statement that 'The quality of decision making on the board is high' is 3 and the average almost 6. The same pattern of a high mean score of over 6 and little dissent occurrs for 'Decisions are made on a well-informed basis', 'I support most of the board's decisions' and 'Trustees follow good governance procedures in making decisions'. There is also a clear consensus among those surveyed that communication among trustees is excellent, that a minimum of jargon is used during board meetings and that there are no hidden agendas.
DECISION MAKING
The ordered logit regressions reported in Table 9 .7 confirm these impressions. For example, agreement with the statement that 'The board is pulling in the same direction' is positively related to the perception that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, and that trustees are given enough time to discuss key issues on the agenda. The results for other variables also suggest strong board cohesion. Table 9 .8 indicates a good partial correlation between those who are aware of their fiduciary responsibilities and those who believe trustees follow good governance procedures. Table 9 .9 shows that the trustees who find it most difficult to grasp issues are also likely to be the ones who are less financially proficient, who believe that decision making is becoming more complex or who are finding it difficult to keep up with current trends. Table 9 .10 presents some summary statistics on questions involving industry issues and Table A9 .1 in Appendix A9.1 gives a breakdown of trustees' responses. There is a strong sense among trustees that they are burdened with too many regulations and that more should be done to assess advisers. There is less of a sense that the current model needs radical rethinking or that there needs to be better selection procedures for trustees. Figure 6 .1 compares the answers of the Australian trustees with those of their British counterparts. As the figure shows, there is a high level of support in both Australia and the United Kingdom for a code of governance for trustees. a 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. a 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree.
INDUSTRY ISSUES
Source: Authors' survey of Australian superannuation funds.
CONCLUSIONS
The survey described in this chapter is one of the first to be undertaken on trustee effectiveness in Australia. Some striking conclusions emerge. Trustees are confident about their overall level of financial skills but only a small proportion have formal training in investment or finance. Trustees tend to serve on boards for lengthy periods of time, and most serve on only one board at a time.
They are hostile to formal regulation, and licensing in particular; most seem to view the present system as functioning relatively efficiently. Nevertheless, most would welcome a code of governance for trustees. Strikingly, despite the significant differences in benefit structures between the United Kingdom and Australia, the results of the Australian survey largely mirror those of a similar survey conducted in the United Kingdom in 2001 (Robinson and Kakabadse 2002; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Kouzmin 2003) . We believe this is because the structures put in place in Australia many years ago for what were then primarily defined benefit schemes have not evolved over time in line with the evolution towards defined contribution schemes. It may now be time for a review of trustee governance in Australia. 
